“… insurgents hold a distinct advantage in their level of local knowledge. They speak the language, move easily within the society, and are more likely to understand the population’s interests. Thus, effective COIN operations require a greater emphasis on certain skills, such as language and cultural understanding, than does conventional warfare. The interconnected, politico-military nature of insurgency and COIN requires immersion in the people and their lives to achieve victory…”

 - General David Petraeus from the manual “Counterinsurgency”.

Combat Outpost Raman Kheil is located in a district of Paktya province where the insurgency is fairly active.  It’s a new combat outpost, shared with the Afghan Army.  I’m told its purpose is to establish control over an area where insurgents have operated with a fair amount of freedom.  When the outpost was first established, they expected it to be fired upon fairly regularly.  That hasn’t happened.  Instead, roadside improvised explosive devices seem to be the weapon of choice. 

Last night we drove out to a farming area near the outpost where two men had been caught placing a device 24 hours earlier.  One insurgent had been killed.  The soldiers hoped to destroy the IED by exploding a charge at its suspected location. 

Afterward, the convoy dropped me off here at Raman Kheil, and continued on toward another IED site.  It was sometime after 9pm.  As we stood outside in the moonlight shortly after the convoy left, we heard an explosion; a deep boom that seemed to come from under the ground.  The convoy had struck an IED.  The explosion was followed by the sound of small arms fire in the distance.

Suddenly the night was alive with activity.  Light spilled onto the sand from the open door of the tiny outpost command center where soldiers worked to gather and convey information about the explosion.  Vermont Guard 1st Sergeant Eric Duncan stood shirtless in the chill air, directing the men in the command center and ordering a QRF – Quick Reaction Force - convoy ‘spun up’ to the site of the explosion.  Soldiers ran from tents and gun truck engines rumbled to life. While Duncan pushed the soldiers in the QRF to move faster, he called orders into the command center to anticipate and counter any insurgent attacks against the QRF or the struck convoy with its disabled vehicle.   Meanwhile additional information was coming in from the convoy.  One vehicle had been disabled.  One soldier sustained minor injuries.   

Duncan describes operations like the one the previous night, where troops are sent out to apprehend low level insurgents and locate isolated IEDs as ‘chasing the flea’.  He said it’s easy for a single insurgent to tie up a company of soldiers for an entire day.  It’s a no-win proposition for the military, yet its one Duncan says the U.S. has pursued in the past in Afghanistan. 

While they still have to chase the flea at Raman Kheil, Duncan says current efforts are based on General David Petraeus’ COIN – Counter insurgency – strategy which reasons that working with the local population is the most effective way, long term, to combat insurgents.   The approach involves clearing an area of insurgents, holding it and then working with the local population to build infrastructure.  In some areas of Afghanistan, the build phase is underway.  Here, though, Vermonters are still taking the first step: trying to clear.